We have successfully completed our migration to RAM-only VPN infrastructure - Blog | Mullvad VPN
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Today we announce that we have completely removed all traces of disks being used by our VPN infrastructure!

Today we announce that we have completely removed all traces of disks being used by our VPN infrastructure!

  • Carlos SolísEnglish
    -2•1 year ago

    I’m aware of PXE, but in order to do so you need either of:

    • the boot image supplying server being in the same intranet as the rest of the other servers, or
    • some sort of method to point the diskless server to the correct external IP address to listen to

    Since the first mode is probably too unsafe, that leaves us with the second mode. Either the operator memorizes a specific IP address and types it into the BIOS each time the server is rebooted, or the IP address (and possibly the checksum of the image) are stored in a single-use pendrive that the operator carries. I wonder which of these two methods is used in this case.

    • @Kangie@lemmy.srcfiles.zip
      4•1 year ago

      PXE is automagic being basically kind of hacky extension to DHCP stuff.

      If PXE is enabled the machine will automatically find it via a DHCP relay on the network.

      the boot image supplying server being in the same intranet as the rest of the other servers … Since the first mode is probably too unsafe, that leaves us with the second mode.

      Why do you think that’s unsafe?

    • @sixCats@lemmy.dbzer0.com
      3•1 year ago

      I’ve never done this, but I believe server network cards can be configured for PXE automatically so

      Bios -> network card -> PXE over network

      So the storage is in the bios config, and then I guess the network card has its own kind of bios?

      • Carlos Solís
        -1•1 year ago

        So there is still one single damning piece of information stored in the servers after all - the IP address to fetch the PXE boot image from. But hey, if Mullvad finds a way to strip even that out of the servers, that’d be great

          • Carlos Solís
            0•1 year ago

            Because by knowing which IP is the boot image stored from, law enforcement can locate the source of the unencrypted image, thus making the scheme lose its privacy. The only way to bypass the issue is by manually configuring the IP after every reboot and keeping it a secret.

              • Carlos Solís
                1•1 year ago

                Because by doing so, law enforcement can manipulate the image from the source by:

                • Intercepting the payload and modifying the operative system to send data to law enforcement
                • Pose as the origin of the original payload, and send the tainted operative system to other devices when they reboot

                Unless, of course, the BIOS stores the checksum of the untainted image. (Which adds its own can of worms, because that would make legitimate image upgrades require writing the new proper checksum on each server)